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Michel Henry: Sense of self and hallucination
Michel Henry: sentimento de si e alucinação
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Abstract
In this paper we develop the thesis of the possibility of understanding human beings, starting from the phenomenality
of their therapeutic needs. We bring the phenomenality of hallucination to the center of the debate. We show how, in
Michel Henry, the phenomenality of sight, touch and anguish is, in all, comparable to the phenomenality of hallucination.
From the starting point of this phenomenality we will understand human actions and thus, the essence of clinical
practice.
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Resumo
Neste texto desenvolveu-se a tese da possibilidade da compreensão do humano a partir da fenomenalidade das suas
necessidades terapêuticas. A fenomenalidade da alucinação é trazida para o centro do debate. Buscou-se mostrar
como é que, em Michel Henry, a fenomenalidade da visão, do tato e da angústia é em tudo comparável com a
fenomenalidade da alucinação. Será a partir dessa fenomenalidade que se compreenderá o agir humano e, com ela,
a essência da clínica.
Palavras-chave: Afeto; Sentimento; Alucinação; Michel Henry; Terapia.
The work of Michel Henry “Genealogy of
Psychoanalysis” (Henry, 1985) recaptures a thesis
of Descartes so that we can, even today, extract
contributions to the intelligibility of emerging issues
in our culture, which involve rethinking a tradition
in its various aspects: philosophy, science, politics,
ethics, aesthetics, and even religion. We refer to
the thesis according to which the truth of
phenomena arises from their effective origination,
and is experienced in and through the
phenomenality of feeling.  A thesis whose reception
in health sciences - clinical practice and psychiatry,
psychology, psychoanalysis, therapeutic monitoring,
free-expression painting studio -, opened space for
interdisciplinary research of which this text is part
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space is made possible by the phenomenality of
feeling that refers us to a transcendental experience
that allows us to understand the dynamics of the
human being in a context of previous
phenomenality and much broader than the one
related to the search of subject/object suitability.
Now, from the phenomenality of this
originating process of our life, the following passage
of Descartes, taken from the “Genealogy of
Psychoanalysis”, includes the theme of sense of self
and hallucination:
We may be deceived by perceptions that
refer to objects that are external to us, and
by perceptions that refer to our body, but
we cannot be deceived in the same way by
our passions because they are so close and
so interior to our soul that it is impossible to
feel them differently. Thus, often while
sleeping and even sometimes when awake,
one imagines certain things so strongly that
he thinks he can see them before himself or
feel them in his body, even if they are not
there. But even if he is asleep or dreaming,
it would not be possible for him to feel sad
or moved by any other passion without it
being true that the soul has that passion
within itself (Henry, 1985, p.37).
It is a perplexing text once you realize
Descartes trusts the experience of the truth of
things. He trusts, but he gives himself an ambit of
phenomenality, the retrieval of which involves much
more than the reversal of the processes and
methodologies of traditional phenomenology that
came from this ambit but had been forgotten. It
involves the immersion in the phenomenality of
which, in traditional phenomenology, is shown to
reason as something unknown to it, irrational, and
savage, to understand it, at the heart of its
effectiveness, its origin or raison d’être. What is
being considered here is, first of all, the attention
to the rationality inherent to the phenomenality of
what is comprehensible only by feeling. Therefore,
what was an irrational assumption appears with
inherent rationality that is seen in the ambit of the
pure affection of life, which is given to us through
feeling. This is the reason why this phenomenality
is irreducible to that anonymous thing which I
confront and turns out to be that which arises in
me for me to feel. That prevents me from
hypostatizing the feeling because I am what I feel.
That is what this enigmatic and, therefore, not-
infrequently quoted expression of Michel Henry
means (Henry, 2001; Marques, 2002): “feeling
never is and never will be able to be sensed… feeling
cannot be perceived either” (Henry, 1963, p.579).
So what I am, what constitutes me, that
which is within the limit of intentionality is given to
me through the experience of feeling of an affection
of life: in Michel Henry, community is suddenly what
I am. Michel Henry says: “naturally the essence of
community is nothing more than that - not this -,
that arises as a tireless onslaught of life, and thus
of oneself” (Henry, 1990, p.178).
I am what I feel, but what I feel is an affection
of life, in which and through which someone
experiences himself. The ambit of the affection of
life reveals this affection in its singularity, in the fabric
of affections: affection of life. This affection can be
of my life in relation to the life of everyone and of
each one of us; of our lives in relation to everything
that happens, within it, as affection. Now, this
affective dimension of life occupies other fields of
research today, not only in the area of philosophy -
phenomenology, analytic philosophy, philosophy of
mind, sciences of cognition -, but also in sciences,
especially in neurosciences. Therefore, what was
ironically presented in Michel Henry as the “truth
that only a madman can say” (Henry, 1981, p.51) is
today an object of investigation in all the areas of
knowledge and culture. An irreducible truth to the
truth of a madman, even though, as we shall see,
this truth may contribute to the understanding of
the truth spoken by a madman.
The connection between the truth of a
madman and the truth of ourselves or even the
connection between the truth of phenomenology
and the truth of neurosciences, particularly in the
psychiatric and psychoanalytical dimension, is
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Along this path, we will consider
hallucination as a paradigm of the phenomenality
of the affective life. First we will show how Michel
Henry brings the phenomenality of life closer to the
phenomenality of hallucination, in order to then
show the receptivity of this theory in health sciences.
Limiting the truth of ourselves to the
truth of feeling
To limit the truth of ourselves to the truth of
feeling implies addressing an ambit of phenomenality
that takes place in an earlier record and is indifferent
to whether or not it is possible to distinguish
subjectivity/objectivity. It is an ambit in which the
primordial experience of ourselves is the experience
of pure affection of life in the sense modalities of
hearing, sight, anxiety, fear. Through these
modalities, life installs itself in us as what we are,
thus causing itself to be experienced. However, if
the phenomenality of what we are, just as
hallucination, is experienced as a feeling of affection
of life; in this experience, the intensity with which
we feel these affections changes. The intensity can
range between unbearability and anesthesia, and
if unbearability can lead to madness, anesthesia or
silence of the senses can lead to alienation from
oneself. This is how hallucination overcomes
alienation: the unbearability of hallucination
prevents us from ignoring the truth of ourselves; it
prevents us from forgetting the possibilities and the
limits of our actions, in their many modalities. The
truth for actions is part of the truth of life.
However, even though the connection
between feeling and acting is extremely important
to the phenomenality of hallucination, we will
explore this connection in section 4, but for now
we shall discuss how hallucination is a paradigm of
the originating phenomenality of life in Michel
Henry.
And if there are doubts regarding the
fairness of this thesis in the philosophical work “The
Genealogy of Psychoanalysis”, they diminish in “The
Son of the King” and they disappear entirely in later
works. In these works we find some elements that
unequivocally support that by showing the truth of
ourselves, not being limited to the truth of objects,
we are allowed to understand the phenomenality
of hallucination in light of the phenomenology of
life, and thus rethink a tradition whose paradigm
of rationality set aside or abandoned essential
questions.
Using phenomenological analysis in terms
of sight, touch, and anguish, Michel Henry
eliminates any doubt about the possibility of the
interpretation we address regarding his
phenomenology. Let us look at the evidence.
The importance of sight and touch for
understanding the truth that can be
experienced through feeling
Although the phenomenality of feeling is,
according to Michel Henry, irreducible to the
phenomenality of the traditional senses - sight,
hearing, touch, smell... -, once anguish,
apprehension, despair, fear, pain, suffering, joy and
hallucination can also be felt, we will show how, in
the phenomenality of sight and touch, he connects
senses and hallucination. For this connection we
have chosen one of the dialogues that Michel Henry
weaves with Descartes, and an exceptional
reference to Aristotle (Henry, 2000), because they
suffice for us to be able to see that what is at issue
are the real possibilities of a phenomenality - the
phenomenality of the senses -, particularly regarding
the understanding of what constitutes us and
cannot be left to the domain of the irrational or
mental illness. Only by connecting feeling and
movement will it be possible to successfully
complete the task of removing from mere
speculation the issues that philosophy poses
(Husserl), understanding that being and life, without
taking into consideration their separation into
subjectivity and objectivity (Heidegger).
However, the phenomenality of the
experience of the senses demands more than the
reversal of the path of phenomenology that
oscillates between noema and noesis; creature and
being, body and flesh, visible and invisible, to situate
ourselves in terms of their phenomenality because
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are the condition for following the path. According
to Descartes, it is within the limits of feeling that
we know ourselves in the sense modalities: a being
who doubts, loves, hates, wants, rejects, walks, sees,
imagines, dreams, feels; a being who knows himself
doubting, loving, hating, wanting, imagining,
feeling. That is, a being who “is only what he
thinks” or who “is only what he feels”. A being
who is in the sense of self in which thinking and
acting are experienced while feeling them. Neither
is the judgment external to the agent, nor is the
agent external to the product of his actions: one
cannot be without the other. And because they are
accomplished in the affect, the affection is the reality
of one’s life and one’s future.
It is interesting then to understand a life that
establishes its possibilities from within its limits
because once we are within our limits of feeling
that is what is really irreducible. It is that which by
itself imposes itself as completely true. In
phenomenological terms it is that which
phenomenological reduction cannot reduce and
whose domain is part of what Michel Henry calls
counter-reduction - Cartesian counter-reduction
(Henry, 2000).
In this domain and in relation to the
phenomenality of seeing, Michel Henry collects, in
order to analyze in phenomenological terms,
expressions such as “see oneself seeing and feeling
oneself seeing”. From these analyses we highlight
the idea of understanding the phenomenality of
seeing as “feeling oneself see” - feeling ourselves
seeing -, that is, phenomenologically limited to the
“sense of self, the idea of externality is a derived
idea” (Henry, 1985, p.38).
This is not an isolated idea in the
phenomenology of life. It is recaptured by the
analyses of touch to show that everything that is
real is processed in the domain of affectivity that is
itself felt: it feels in the absence of touching (Henry,
2000).
Will there be anything closer to hallucination
than the phenomenology of life in Michel Henry?
There is nothing closer! We could even say there is
nothing more identical. However, it is this property
of being identical that allows us to carry the
Aristotelian question of movement and action
(Henry, 2000) to an ambit of phenomenality that
will answer the questions that we pose today: the
questions concerning a body that, feeling the
affections of life, moves and is realized in life. To
summarize, a body that lives in and of life. We see
the same thing in Michael Henry when he says that
the phenomenality of touch changes not only our
comprehension of reality but also reality itself: “then
reality has changed” (Henry, 2000, p.211).
These analyses of the phenomenality of the
senses of sight and touch as phenomenological
analyses of feeling are extensible to the phenomenality
of pain, anguish, fear, despair and hallucination,
that is, to the experiential unity of our living.
Therefore, the possibility of our actions can be
inferred from these words of Michel Henry: “man
begins where this life starts, defined as how to feel
himself, how to experience, and he ends where it
ends. This domain of phenomenality is the domain
of ethics” (Henry, 2010, p.10).
It is in this connection between sense of self
and ethics that it is possible to answer, starting from
the Cartesian corpus, from the evidence of truth in
the phenomenality of feeling, the questions
resulting from the link between ethics and the
affections of the life of the body. To show this
possibility let us first see how the phenomenality of
anguish operates towards the final judgment of the
body and, with it, towards the final judgment of a
tradition.
Towards the final judgment of the body,
towards the final judgment of a
tradition: The phenomenality
of anguish on the path opened
by phenomenological reduction
The examples of phenomenality of sight
and touch show that, methodologically, the
phenomenological reduction more than limits a
certain field of research, opens a transcendental
experience irreducible to any methodological
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of seeing and touching. Michel Henry describes this
experience as a “transcendental experience of an
indefinitely evocable power” (Henry, 1985, p.395)
and, as such, a source of pleasure: the eye that sees
wants to see even more...! But what is the
experience of this indefinitely evocable power if not
the experience of freedom within the phenomenality
of feeling: of pathos? The phenomenality of anguish
answers this question: “the anguish suffers from
the law of pathos and the dizziness of freedom at
the same time” (Henry, 1985, p.276).
The fertility of the field of research opened
by this ambit of phenomenality that connects the
law of pathos and freedom, in Michel Henry, leads
to several directions, of which aesthetics, politics
and religion are the best known. However, it is in
this connection between sense of self and
hallucination that these directions, among others,
accomplish the goal intended by Michel Henry: to
find in the relationship between freedom and
pathos a way out of the prison of being and of life
in themselves. However, if Michel Henry establishes
this relationship between pathos and liberty through
the phenomenality of anguish, it is through the
phenomenality of hallucination that the possibility
of escaping this prison paradoxically becomes
present. First because this way out is not only
presented as a possible “task” from which one
wants to escape (Henry, 1985), but it is also how I
truly become myself! Second, because when all our
tasks find the proper place of their realization, what
is important is “not to succumb” (Henry, 1981, p.65)
to any of the terms that make them possible:
freedom and laws of pathos. In this relationship,
the process of interior generation becomes effective,
which matters today not only to phenomenology
and theology, but also to politics, ethics, clinical
practice, and aesthetics (Henry, 2004). But among
us, the receptivity of material phenomenology has
occurred mainly within the ambit of neurosciences,
clinical practice, psychiatry, psychoanalysis and
psychology, and it is within this context that we
now connect sense of self and hallucination,
showing the operation in clinical phenomenology
of life presented here (Antúnez & Martins, 2015).
Revision of the state of the question we
have developed in this article
We have begun this article by questioning
the possibility, through Descartes, to redefine the
human being through the phenomenality of feeling.
We contextualized the debate around this question,
showing its importance at present, as both Henry
and Marion (2003) present it as an answer to the
epistemological contributions addressed mainly by
the sciences of life. However, our first intention is
to reach the irreducible specificity of the one who
comes to the encounter of the therapist, hoping to
understand oneself through his help. The
phenomenality of feeling enables the understanding
of the human being through the concreteness or
positivity of his selfhood - his anguished, sad, absent
being -, and not through a theoretical neurotic,
psychotic model that redefines him by an ontological
deficit.
Departing from the simple phenomenality
of sight or touch we show how the human being
inhabits them, because each and every dimension
of feeling - seeing, listening, touching -, refers to
the affective foundation of life that makes itself,
within it, evident. That is, the phenomenality of
feeling integrates and congregates the
phenomenality of senses, being those much more
than simple epiphenomena reducible to an empirical
dimension or to a denounced exteriority. And even
if it begins to be consensual along the new theories
of cognition, the articulation between the sense
evidences and the judgment inherent to its
phenomenality, the issue of the redefinition of the
human through this debate is not even, at times,
considered.
Therefore, that is the central issue of this
article through which we reflect upon the statement
of Michel Henry that says that “when we
understand the human being through the
phenomenality of senses in itself, namely touching,
then everything changes” (Henry, 2000, p.211).
Everything changes: not only our understanding of
the human changes, but its own reality. We remind,
therefore, that the phenomenality of senses not only
points to an effective donation of life, but yet to
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It is the phenomenality of anguish that opens
us up to the investigation of such conditions. An
anguished being is susceptible of being suspended
of reality and circumstance, in a way to inhabit it
with quality. Therefore, the phenomenality of
feeling, instead of imprisoning us to reality, enables,
through feeling itself, an opening and freedom to
the other, to circumstance, time, and concrete
conditions of our living that immediately interdicts
any comprehension of the phenomenology of life.
In Michel Henry, that is independent of such
relationship inasmuch as the human being redefines
himself in it and through it.
The operability of such phenomenality in
psychotherapies is of utmost importance.
Accordingly, section 4 assumes the phenomenality
of anguish as indispensable to the understanding
not only of the reality deficit, but the way of being
of this being we call “human”.
Issues such as the phenomenality of freedom
through the phenomenality of feeling with the
consequent relationship to its therapeutic
possibilities are hereby approached in a way to
present the operability of Michel Henry’s
phenomenology. In this regard, clinical practice once
again challenges the phenomenologist, as it has
been done in the introduction of this article. Issues,
such as the possibility of redefining the roles and
representations both of the therapist and the one
who searches for him in order to understand
himself, invite us to place the phenomenality of
community, itself also, within the pragmatic
boundaries of its outcome.
However, the phenomenality of community
is not exclusively concerned with the relationship
between therapist/ill patient. It also concerns the
community of those who have the same purpose:
“to return a sick life to its power and happiness of
living” (Henry, 2001, p.142).
Faithful to such reflection of Michel Henry
inasmuch as we believe it to be absolutely fair and
present, we aspire for more than remembering it,
we wish to give it continuity.
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